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Abstract One important aspect of the transition to modernity is the survival of
elements of the Old Regime beyond the French Revolution. It has been claimed that
this can explain why in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries some Western
countries adopted national corporatist structures while others transformed into liberal
market economies. One of those elements is the persistence or absence of guild
traditions. This is usually analyzed in a national context. This article aims to contribute
to the debate by investigating the development of separate trades in Germany, the
United Kingdom, and The Netherlands throughout the nineteenth century. We distin-
guish six scenarios of what might have happened to crafts and investigate how the
prevalence of each of these scenarios in the three countries had an impact on the
emerging national political economies. By focusing on trades, rather than on the
Theor Soc (2018) 47:255–291
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-018-9316-8
* Marcel Hoogenboom
m.j.m.hoogenboom@uu.nl
Christopher Kissane
christopher.kissane@gmail.com
Maarten Prak
m.prak@uu.nl
Patrick Wallis
p.h.wallis@lse.ac.uk
Chris Minns
C.Minns@lse.ac.uk
1 Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 1,
3584 CSUtrecht, The Netherlands
2 Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton
Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
3 Department of History and Art History, Utrecht University, Drift 6, 3512 BSUtrecht,
The Netherlands
national political economy, our analysis demonstrates that in each country the forma-
tion of national political economies and citizenship rights was not the result of a
national pattern of guild survival. Rather, the pattern that emerged by the end of the
nineteenth century was determined by the balance between old and new industries, and
that between national and regional or local government.
Keywords Guilds . Citizenship . Political economy.Modernization, Europe
The nineteenth century is often portrayed as the era of laissez-faire, of unbridled
capitalism, a Smithian paradise of free markets and minimal government interference.
Even if this picture held true in some places and decades, it still provides a fundamen-
tally misleading portrait of a century that witnessed the emergence of political parties,
cooperatives, as well as labor unions and employer organizations. These latter orga-
nized interests started to clamor for regulations in multiple areas: workplace safety,
limitations on child labor and working hours, and consumer safety, welfare, and skills-
formation. The emerging arrangements were remarkably varied across Europe and in
recent decades historians, sociologists, and political scientists have attempted to explain
this wide array of national political economies and indeed the electoral systems
underpinning them. This literature has concentrated on explaining why some Western
countries adopted corporatist structures or Bcoordinated market economies^ while
others transformed into Bliberal market economies^ (Hall and Soskice 2001). In their
analyses, scholars identify a range of factors that may explain differences between
national systems, like religious and non-economic cleavages (Rokkan 1970; Boix
1999), the presence of strong rural cooperatives (Katzenstein 1985; Crouch 1993),
specific types of labor unions (Guinnane and Timothy 2001), a large-skill-based export
sector (Crouch 1993; Thelen 2004) and the persistence of craft guild traditions.
On the persistence of craft guild traditions, Cusack, Iversen & Soskice (2007, pp.
374 and 379), for example, have theorized that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries in someWestern countries Ba strong guild tradition […] in complex ways^ led
to the emergence of strong and cooperative employers’ associations and labor unions,
which Bwere accustomed to solving collective action problems through associations^
and this in turn benefitted the choice of an electoral system based on proportional
representation over a majority system. The problem with this type of argument is not
that it is necessarily wrong, but that the underlying mechanisms are poorly document-
ed. By filling the knowledge gap on early forms of citizenship in the formation of
twentieth-century political economies in three northwestern European countries, this
article aims to contribute to the debate by investigating the transformation of Old
Regime craft guilds into their nineteenth-century successors.
The argument about the historical link between the presence or absence of guild
traditions and national political economies is essentially addressing the transformation
of citizenship rights. Before 1800, in many Western European countries guilds not only
regulated and monitored access to economic production; guild membership also im-
plied access to local political citizenship and social support (Prak 2018). Hence craft
guilds could be seen as the bearers of citizenship rights, which at the time were
consolidated on the local, instead of the national level. Similarly, by linking (or not
linking) occupational status to access to political and economic decision-making and to
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social protection, the Western European political economies and electoral systems that
emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a reflection of the
distribution of citizenship rights at the national level.
Largely following Marshall (1950), this article distinguishes three types of citizen-
ship rights: economic, political, and social. Economic rights (a subcategory of Mar-
shall’s Bcivil rights,^ which also includes juridical rights, which are not addressed here)
refer to rights to occupation and settlement of a business, organize interest groups, and
participate in collective skills-formation. Political rights include the right to political
association and to participate in political decision-making by electing representatives or
otherwise. Social rights entail the right to receive social support from the community in
times of need. Given the complexity of the question and the space available, the data
come from three countries—Germany, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands—that
represent three distinct trajectories of industrialization and democratization. These
countries have been selected because they represent three distinct political economies,
both before and after the transition. England was the first country to develop modern
industry and guilds were already weakened there before 1800. The Netherlands trans-
formed from a federal republic into a centralized monarchy and was a late industrializer
during the nineteenth century. Germany remained a federation and although another
late industrializer, it was one of the leaders of the so-called second Industrial Revolu-
tion in the second half of the nineteenth century. The case selection thus offers a range
of possibilities, without claiming to be exhaustive. Including other countries like France
or Spain would have enriched the range of samples but, we believe, not affect the
analytical results in any fundamental way.
By investigating the role of guild traditions in the formation of national political
economies and citizenship right systems, this article aims at contributing to the Bneo-
institutionalist^ literature on various Btypes^ of national political economies—or
Bvarieties of capitalism^ (Hall and Soskice 2001), or Bworlds of welfare capitalism^
(Esping-Andersen 1990)—but in a distinctive manner. Central to this literature is the
idea of Bpath dependence^ (Mahoney 2000; Thelen 2004), which in this literature is
usually applied to explain the Bstickiness^ of existing political economy institutions and
their inability to change (e.g., Pierson 2000), but generally not to clarify the specific
origins of these institutions, which are usually explained by applying a Bpower
resources^ approach (Esping-Andersen 1990; Pierson 2000; Thelen 2004).
At first sight, abandoning the path dependence approach when it comes to
explaining the origins of national political economy institutions seems plausible. After
all, most countries had hardly any national socio-economic institutions when Bmodern^
national political economies were forged. Yet the absence of a national path does not
necessarily imply that national political economies emerged out of the blue. As Scott
(2008, p. 94) puts it, B[i]nstitutions do not emerge in a vacuum; they always challenge,
borrow from, and, to varying degree, displace prior institutions^. As this article aims to
demonstrate, when national political economy institutions were built, frequently a path
or paths did exist—but not at the national level. These paths had been trodden by local
and trade communities and had long historical lineages. Yet when in the course of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Bmodern^ national political economies were
created, often various paths (or Bworlds^: Sabel and Zeitlin 1985, 2002) were available.
This article seeks to explain how in the three selected countries a specific path could
dictate the course of national political economy and citizenship formation and others
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could not. The central question in this article therefore is: BHow did guild traditions
shape the transition to modern society, including the transformation of local into
national citizenship rights, in Western European countries?^
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly characterize the
functions of craft guilds in early modern Western Europe and develop an analytical tool
that can help us to investigate their fate in the nineteenth century. This search will result
in six scenarios on the development of trades, to be analyzed and illustrated next with
descriptions of their nineteenth-century development. We then focus on the prevalence
of these six scenarios in the three countries we selected and their influence on the
emerging national political economies. The final section contains the discussion and
conclusion.
Analyzing guilds and their abolition
Until about 1800, in many Western European countries craft guilds were the bearers of
local citizenship rights. Already in the Middle Ages guilds were intimately linked with
citizenship, either because citizenship was a prerequisite to become a guild master or
because a guild apprenticeship qualified a person for local citizenship (Epstein 1991;
Kluge 2007). Also on an ideological level, guilds and citizenship were closely
intertwined. In many places, the incorporated trades were known as Bcitizen’s trades,^
and in petitions guildsmen portrayed their guild membership as part of their civic
identity and as the economic underpinning of their middle-class existence, which in
turn was seen as appropriate for citizens (Prak 1996, 2018). Economically, the guilds
might coordinate the setting of prices and wages, but by the eighteenth century this was
relatively unusual. The guild’s economic activities tended to be in the realm of
coordination rather than in direct market interventions. One area where this is partic-
ularly clear is the organization of apprenticeship, according to some experts the guilds’
single most important economic contribution (Epstein 1998). Politically, the guilds in
some towns and cities had a direct say in the selection of officials; sometimes their own
officials were members of the town council. Still, such direct representation happened
only in a minority of towns. Elsewhere, guilds had to be satisfied with lobbying the
local government, which could be almost as effective (Van Nierop 2007). Socially,
guilds had two roles to play in pre-modern towns. From the very start, many guilds
provided some sort of social security to their members. This could be informal help, or
completely formalized to the extent that a separate account was maintained to handle
the dedicated funds. In some places journeymen had their own welfare schemes (Van
Leeuwen 2012). Guilds’ second social contribution was the creation of a sense of
belonging. This may be difficult to pin down, but the documents handed down to us
speak over and over again of Bbrothers^ and Bsisters,^ urging members to Blove^ each
other, and describing the numerous social activities that went on in guilds (Rosser
2015).
This brief characterization of pre-1800 guilds and their functions largely holds for
the early modern period in most of Western Europe. On the eve of the French
Revolution, only in the United Kingdom had many guilds already become ineffective,
largely due to the inability or unwillingness of the authorities to uphold the charters and
regulations that had previously underpinned their powers (Rule 1981). In The Netherlands
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andmany of the German states guilds were formally abolished during the period of French
occupation (1794–1815). In The Netherlands, guilds would never be formally reinstated,
although many survived informally. In most German states the authorities were following
a zigzag course in the nineteenth century, alternating between different attempts to
stimulate economic development, either by lifting all sorts of protective regulations or
by reinstalling guilds and guild-like regulations, particularly in times of social upheaval.
What happened to citizenship rights in these countries after guilds and their regula-
tions had been formally or de facto abolished? In theory, the abolition had two major
consequences. First, access to a trade was no longer regulated by formal rules, and if
economic relations were not immediately reorganized by a strong national state,
economic and social rights remained ambiguous. In theory they were accessible to all
and sundry, but whether this also was true in practice remains to be seen. Second,
political citizenship rights became generally more limited because of franchise thresh-
olds and simultaneously less significant as local authorities lost much of their auton-
omous powers to national institutions, which were even less accessible to voters in
most countries during much of the nineteenth century. In other words, the changes of
the nineteenth century may have given more people more rights in theory, but in
practice fewer rights were available to fewer people, because of the abolishment of
the civic institutions that previously gave them political and economic agency.
According to Crouch (1986, p. 182), if we want to understand what happened to
citizenship rights in various Western European countries we must look at the temporal
Bgap^ between the disappearance of guilds and guild-like regulations, and the emer-
gence of national political economies:
[T]he longer the interval, or the sharper the breach, between the destruction of
ancient guild and Ständestaat institutions and the construction of typically
Bmodern^ interest organizations, the more committed did the state become to
liberal modes of interest representation, and the less likely to tolerate sharing
political space; the less likely were modern organizations to target their ambitions
on participation of that kind; and the less likely were neo-corporatist institutions
to become established.
Essentially, Crouch’s theory of gaps, reformulated in neo-institutionalist terms, ad-
dresses the availability of a path or paths, but leaves open the possibility that no such
path existed and that the construction of national political economies was a matter of
political actors and social movements struggling over whose preferences for a national
political economy were to be implemented. In that sense, Crouch’s theory is an (early)
attempt to reconcile path dependence theory with the power resources approach (see
also Crouch 2001, 2005).
While Crouch’s theory of gaps is an interesting starting point, in its current form it is
too broad to be tested. First, in his analysis Crouch looks at nineteenth-century
countries as homogeneous entities, ignoring that national political economies emerged
from a constellation where the economy was regulated at the local level and where
variation within countries was therefore substantial. Hence our analysis should address
not only how Bold^ socio-economic and political regulatory mechanisms were replaced
by Bnew^ ones, but also how and whether regulatory mechanisms were transplanted
from the local to the national level, and how local variety eventually transformed into
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national unity. Moreover, in the pre-1800s era the extent to which trades were regulated
by means of guilds and similar organizations not only diverged between cities and
towns within single countries, but also within the cities and towns themselves. There-
fore, it makes more sense to start our investigation with a focus on trades. The crucial
questions here are:
1. To what extent was a specific trade regulated by means of guilds or guild-like
regulations in the pre-1800 period?
2. To what extent was a specific trade regulated by means of guilds or guild-like
regulations after 1800?
Second, Crouch implicitly assumes that the abolition of the guilds in the late
eighteenth or in the nineteenth century automatically meant the end of the old regula-
tory mechanisms. Yet in practice artisans often remained capable of regulating access to
their trade and skills-formation for a long time, even after guilds were formally
abolished (Koselleck 1967; Crossick 1997). Breuilly (1985) thinks that the extent to
which artisans of a formally abolished guild were capable of retaining their regulating
powers related to the characteristics of the production processes in that trade. The
crucial question here is: Could production processes be easily industrialized, i.e.,
standardized and mechanized? Whereas some crafts were largely destroyed or consid-
erably transformed by industrialization, others were hardly affected by it. A third
question thus arises that needs to be answered:
3. To what extent could production processes in a specific trade be industrialized?
When combining the possible answers to our three questions, we can distinguish six
scenarios for what may have happened to individual trades during the nineteenth
century (see Table 1).
In the next section we demonstrate that these scenarios actually unfolded in the three
countries we selected and we analyze what the scenarios actually meant for the
economic, political, and social citizenship rights of masters (or Bemployers^),
journeymen, and apprentices (or Bworkers^). Then we analyze how, throughout the
Table 1 Craft trades in the nineteenth century: six scenarios
Strong guild
before 19th century?
Guild or informal regulatory
mechanisms effective deep
into 19th century?
Production processes
easy to industrialize?
1. Old artisanism Yes Yes No
2. Industrialized artisanism Yes Yes Yes
3. Liberalized artisanism Yes No No
4. Destroyed artisanism Yes No Yes
5. New artisanism No – No
6. New industrialism No – Yes
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nineteenth century, the developments in the economic and political spheres coincided
and shaped national political economies in these countries. As we demonstrate, decisive
was not only how and whether individual trades in our three countries and the
regulatory mechanisms in these trades transformed in the nineteenth century, but also
which of these trades came to dominate the development of national political econo-
mies by the end of the century.
Artisans, economic liberalization, and industrialization in the nineteenth
century
Based on the theoretical exploration in the previous section we theorize that in the
nineteenth century trades may have developed along six lines that we call Bscenarios^.
In this section we will explore these scenarios: What happened to the access to the trade
and to the position of masters, journeymen, and apprentices? What interest organiza-
tions developed? And what did that mean for labor relations? (For a summary of the
key characteristics of each scenario, see Table 2.)
Old artisanism
The trades that most obviously contradict the standard story of a nineteenth century of
free markets and industrialism are those where old guilds or guild-like regulatory
mechanisms formally or informally survived throughout the century, and where mech-
anization of production processes was (almost) impossible. In some cases, guilds or
guild-like regulatory mechanisms survived for political reasons, as in Prussia, where the
authorities saw guilds as a bulwark against radicalism and the organization of workers
(Bergmann 1973). Guild regulations could also survive because of the strategic value of
the trade for local authorities, for example if they were considered essential to social
peace or hygiene (Van Genabeek 1994). There were also various reasons why produc-
tion processes in these trades were not or hardly industrialized, for example because
industrialization was technically not (yet) possible or unnecessary because the market
was purely local (Breuilly 1985).
An example displaying virtually all of the above was the butchers’ trade in the City
of London. Here, as in many British cities and towns (Grady 2000; MacLachlan 2004),
throughout the nineteenth century small-scale butchers managed to ward off a number
of threats to their independence and artisanism, so that BLondon entered the twentieth
century as it had entered the nineteenth, with a meat supply that was only partially
inspected and with hundreds of small-scale slaughter-houses dispersed throughout the
metropolitan region^ (MacLachlan 2007, p. 254). Part of the explanation for this
continuity was the stable organization of London slaughterers, cutters, and retailers,
which went back to the tenth century when the Worshipful Company of Butchers had
been established. From the fourteenth century, this guild, or Blivery company,^ as
guilds in the City of London were called, had been formally entitled to regulate labor
conditions, training, wages, and quality standards in the butchers’ trade in the City
and one mile around it. As the City expanded massively during the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, Bnon-freemen^—butchers who lacked
membership in the Company because they had not been formally apprenticed—opened
Theor Soc (2018) 47:255–291 261
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up shops outside the City boundaries, but as the freemen largely controlled the supply
of livestock on the hoof at the Smithfield cattle market, and after 1855 the Metropolitan
Cattle Market in Islington, other butchers in the City were completely dependent on the
Company. As a result, despite the formal abolition of the guilds in the United Kingdom
in 1799, guild-like structures remained dominant in London butchery, even when from
the 1850s trade liberalization allowed the importation of large quantities of foreign
cattle to the United Kingdom (Jones 1976).
From the 1820s, the biggest threat to the Company’s dominance were campaigns by
engineers, physicians, reformers and local residents to abolish the large number of
private slaughter-houses in favor of large public abattoirs, out of public order concerns
(daily herds of livestock heading for Smithfield market were blocking the City streets)
and for public health reasons (livestock and slaughter offal were considered health
risks). Throughout the nineteenth century, London butchers and their organizations
managed to bat away such criticisms by playing public opinion and local authorities
(MacLachlan 2007). The butchers claimed that centralizing slaughtering in a limited
number of public abattoirs would increase, not decrease, public health risks. In a pre-
refrigeration age, meat would spoil quickly if waiting for customers, a risk that could be
limited if local butchers Bstored^ the meat on the hoof in their businesses. Butchers also
appealed to the widespread laissez-faire belief by portraying themselves as defenders of
private enterprise against government intrusion. The success in averting change enabled
London butchers to continue their trade throughout the nineteenth century without
major changes in their workshops and production processes (Jones 1976).
The case of the London butchers is not at all unique. The fate of butchers in Berlin
was largely similar, although in Berlin public authorities were more deliberately and
explicitly protecting the trade as part of a wider policy to prevent radicalism and
workers’ organization (Bergmann 1973; Brantz 2003). In all three countries we find,
throughout the nineteenth century, brewers, grocers, bakers, and similar tradespeople
maintaining control over the access to product and labor markets because they met
basic demands of the domestic population (cf. Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004). As they
managed to maintain control over access and production was very difficult to mecha-
nize, production processes and labor relations remained largely unaltered.
Yet the trades that followed this scenario did not contribute much to the continuation
of guild traditions within national political economies, because they tended to operate at
the local level, and their interest representation was also primarily directed at the local
political arena. It seems that at least some substantial change was necessary to Bunlock^
trades from their local orientation and to produce organizational forms—employers’
associations, labor unions, corporatist structures—capable of influencing developments
at the national level (Kocka 1984). Such situations could be found among the crafts that
followed the second and third scenarios—industrialized artisanism and liberalized
artisanism.
Industrialized artisanism
The second scenario also concerns trades in which, before 1800, guilds functioned as
local economic (semi-)monopolies that formally or informally remained deep into the
nineteenth century. The crucial difference with the first scenario (old artisanism) is that
production processes, or parts of them, in these trades were relatively easy to
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standardize and to mechanize. In the course of the nineteenth century, therefore, when
new technologies became available, industrialization in these trades could take place
within a more or less Btraditional^ framework.
An example of industrialized artisanism was the printing trade in the German lands,
which was concentrated in cities like Leipzig and Frankfurt. Even though pre-
nineteenth-century German printers often lacked independent guilds, the trade had
strong regulations and protection through the Postulat, Ba statute with a long tradition^
that established training times and procedures, and gave journeymen printers the right
to take on and to train apprentices. Journeymen printers engaged in long spells of
journeying, both to learn skills and because a broad knowledge and cosmopolitanism
was considered essential to their skill. Journeymen were thus the main employees of
Bprincipals^ – publishers, booksellers or editors who owned the German printing shops
(Welskopp 2010, p. 65). In most of Germany, these typical guild-like traits remained
relevant far into the nineteenth century—including the practice to ban women from the
trade. This happened despite gradual erosion of the Postulat throughout the nineteenth
century and a significant increase in the number and size of printing workshops from
the 1830s, due to innovations in printing presses and paper manufacturing. After 1850,
the social distance between what were now employer and employees increased, and the
latter, now that Bthe chance for a journeyman printer or typesetter to set up shop for
themselves [became] slim,^ organized into Bcraft unions^ (ibid., p. 64; see also Kocka
1990). These unions had a clear focus on the trade itself and on improving material
conditions for printers, and they had a strong craft identity that viewed printing as an
Bart^ threatened by modern commerce. As previously under the Postulat, these unions
were engaging in collective bargaining with employers already in the 1860s; this
continued after printers’ unions were integrated into national labor union federations
in the late nineteenth century (Beier 1968).
The development of the German printing trade is illustrative of a considerable
number of trades in all three countries, such as silk-weaving in Britain (Jones 1987),
diamond-cutting and printing in the Netherlands (Hofmeester 2004; Knotter 1993), and
many highly specialized trades in Germany, such as metallurgy and production of
cutlery, optical equipment, and weapons. What these trades had in common was that,
during much of the nineteenth century, protective (guild-) regulations limited the
access—of both employers and workers—to the trade. When the industrialization of
production processes in these trades commenced and when protective regulations were
gradually lifted in mid-century, enterprising masters were at the center of developments
(Crossick 1997). The occupational group meanwhile continued to exert large influence
over access via skill-formation; specific skills remained indispensable in these trades,
despite the partial mechanization of production processes (Herrigel 1996).
With their workshops gradually turning into larger-scale production units, enterpris-
ing masters became the Bemployers^ of artisan Bworkers^, who nevertheless retained
their skills and organizational identity and who often considered themselves to be part
of a Blabor aristocracy .^ One consequence was that unionization in these trades, which
often started early, resulted in typical craft unions that resembled pre-1800s organiza-
tions of journeymen, focused on bonding, entertainment, and organizing mutual insur-
ance funds. After 1850, when economic and population growth enabled employers in
these trades to hire increasing numbers of apprentices—often underpaid and poorly
trained, never outgrowing the apprentice status—the craft unions transformed into
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Bmodern^ labor unions. These unions, which usually organized relatively large per-
centages of the workers in the trade, sought to defend the Btraditional rights^ of the
artisan workers, if necessary by means of trade-wide strikes (Breuilly 1985; Lenger
1991; Leisink and Leisink 1994). Despite the concentration on their own trades, by the
turn of the twentieth century these labor unions were amongst the first to establish
national organizations, which in turn greatly contributed to the establishment of
national labor union federations (Hueting et al. 1983; Hanagan 1988).
Meanwhile, masters/employers in these trades were generally slow to organize,
arguably since they were unfamiliar with the rebelliousness of the artisan workers
and their organizations. Instead of establishing their own associations, they initially
attempted to frustrate union activity by banning union members from their companies
(Yarmie 1980; Knotter 1993). When this failed, employers’ associations, which had
often grown directly out of guilds (Herrigel 1993), sought to pacify the unions by trying
to re-establish Btraditional^ modes of conflict reconciliation, often successfully. For
example, in the 1900s Dutch labor unions and employers’ associations in the printing
trade signed the first collective local labor agreements, and they were also the first to
conclude at a national level such an agreement containing far-reaching regulations like
compulsory membership in their organizations for both workers and employers and
trade-wide binding administration of justice (Leisink and Leisink 1994).
Liberalized artisanism
The third scenario covers trades where guilds were strong before 1800 but already lost
their effectiveness in the early nineteenth century. As in the first scenario of old
artisanism, industrialization of production processes in these trades proved difficult
for technical reasons or unnecessary because they produced predominantly for local
markets. And as in the first scenario, this situation caused skills, rather than capital and
machines, to remain the trades’ key production factor. Yet, due to the early abolition of
protective regulations, artisans were no longer capable of controlling product and labor
markets. This had two far-reaching consequences. First, since masters could no longer
control product markets, competition increased markedly. Consequently, despite the
limited social divide between masters/employers and journeymen/workers, labor rela-
tions were constantly under pressure. Second, as masters could no longer control labor
markets the old apprentice system was undermined, causing skills-formation to become
problematic in these trades (Crossick 1997).
An example of this scenario was the building trade in the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. During the nineteenth century, mechanization in this trade was low, since at
least in the century’s first decades much of the work concerned repairs and renovations,
while new constructions usually required made-to-measure work (Knotter 1984;
Powell 1996). Building in both countries remained largely reliant on hand tools and
manual work, and only after 1850 did technical developments gradually start to affect
the trade. The 1860s saw the introduction of some standardized parts in plumbing and
carpentry. Standardization and the use of pre-fabricated parts increased thereafter:
window frames, bricks, and other materials became more regular. Some powered
machinery began to be used, like steam cranes and drilling machines, but this only
had a real impact toward the end of the century (McKenna and Rodger 1985).
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The real change in this period concerned the organizational structure of labor
relations in the trade. Until the early nineteenth century, apprenticeship requirements
had formally (e.g., The Netherlands) or informally (e.g., the United Kingdom) regu-
lated access to the building trade and skills-formation. The abolition of these require-
ments had little initial impact: small localized firms with a Btraditional^ master-
journeymen relationship continued to dominate the trade. However, when demand
exploded midcentury due to population growth, the commissioning of public works
and large companies’ investments, small builders increasingly became subcontractors
of larger firms that took on huge projects, and as a result they were forced to specialize
(Knotter 1993; Powell 1996). Growing demand also opened up the market for new
competitors, who felt less obliged to adhere to traditional informal agreements about
wages, skills-formation and so on. As a result, the employment of non-skilled workers,
pressure on wages, and incidence of temporary contracts all increased. Both in
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom this led to the establishment of labor unions
along occupational lines, seeking to preserve members’ traditional rights. The same
developments also eroded the apprenticeship system in the building trade. Employers
and local authorities, increasingly anxious about the situation, launched vocational
schools, which in subsequent decades rapidly spread across the country but could not
entirely replace the old apprenticeship system (Schalk 2016).
The scenario of liberalized artisanism can be observed in other trades where
mechanization of production processes was only partially possible or necessary, like
shoemaking and tobacco processing in the Netherlands (Van der Ven 1953) or the
clothing industry in the Netherlands (ibid.) and Germany (Quataert 1985). In these
trades too, limited industrialization resulted in a Bdualization,^ with medium-sized
factories producing the raw materials to manufacture artisan products in small work-
shops. In such workshops, labor conditions were comparable with those under the first
scenario (old artisanism), but relations were tenser. Due to the inability to regulate
access to the trade, for example, via skills-formation, workers from outside the occu-
pational group could also enter (cf. Breuilly 1985; Kocka 1984). Initially, artisan
workers resisted this intrusion of their trades by trying to limit access, for example
by establishing Bproduction cooperatives,^ i.e., associations of artisans who tried to sell
their labor collectively. When these failed, workers teamed up with newcomers against
employers by establishing—often explicitly socialist or syndicalist—labor unions
(Kocka 1984; Lenger 1991). Yet despite the unions’ militancy, labor conflict in these
trades would only rarely resemble the outright class wars typical of our fourth and sixth
scenarios. Eventually the small social and spatial distance between employer and
workers in these trades forced both sides to seek compromise. In the late nineteenth
century, interest organizations in these trades were amongst the promoters of corporatist
structures at the local level, for example in various Dutch towns and cities, where in the
1890s labor unions and employers associations in construction established permanent
voluntary Labor Councils (Arbeidsraden) to reconcile labor disputes (Van Veen 2013).
Destroyed artisanism
The three scenarios discussed so far challenge the standard notion that in the nineteenth
century artisanism was swept away by free markets and the mechanization of produc-
tion processes. The fourth scenario, Bartisan destruction,^ demonstrates that if
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monopolies in product and labor markets in a trade were removed at an early stage, and
if production processes could be easily standardized and mechanized, artisanism might
rapidly disappear, even when built on long-standing guild traditions (Cf. Kocka 1984).
This was the case in the textile industry of Twente, a region in the eastern Nether-
lands. From the late sixteenth century, Twente’s urban textile spinners and weavers
were organized in guilds that, helped by the local authorities, had managed to monop-
olize the product and labor markets in their towns. Yet since they Bhad very little power
over the nearby countryside^, while in the countryside itself B[f]eudal ties had largely
slacked^, textile spinning and weaving could also develop in rural areas (Trompetter
1997, p. 144). Small farmers compensated low returns of agriculture on their sandy
soils by spinning yarn from flax and weaving linen cloths that they sold to local
entrepreneurs, who exported them overseas. When around 1800 guilds in
The Netherlands were formally abolished, Twente entrepreneurs quickly started to
concentrate textile production in one urban center, Enschede, and imported the first
Spinning Jennies from the United Kingdom. With the help of the Dutch government,
the Twente textile trade was gradually industrialized, wiping away hand weaving, in
both towns and countryside, and destroying the traditional apprentice system by
establishing weaving schools preparing large numbers of workers for labor in the
new factories (Trompetter 1997).
After 1850, the mechanization of textile production transformed the small town of
Enschede into a large industrial center. In the process, skilled artisans were replaced by
immigrant workers who Boriginated from the countryside population, were used to
possessing almost nothing, hardly educated, and did not form a coherent class.^ This
entirely renewed worker population accepted the mechanization of their trade, the
worsened labor conditions, and the growing social and political powers of their em-
ployers Bwith almost complete passivity^ (Boot 1935, p. 305, our translation). Yet while
industrial expansion accelerated, the number of strikes gradually increased, culminating
in outright class wars in the late 1880s and 1890s. These resulted in the establishment of
the first labor unions and employers’ associations. In the following decades labor
relations in the Twente textile industry remained volatile, with massive strikes and
lock-outs and a lack of willingness on both sides to compromise and to establish conflict
reconciliation structures at the local level (Van Nederveen Meerkerk et al. 2010).
The Dutch cotton trade is illustrative of a number of industries like weaving and
garment production in the United Kingdom and Germany (Bythell 1969; Biernacki
1995). The early abolition of guilds and guild-like regulatory mechanisms, combined
with rapid mechanization of production processes, destroyed the artisan world of
masters, journeymen, and apprentices almost overnight. And since it was destroyed
so quickly, functional equivalents for interest representation, conflict reconciliation, and
skills-formation were slow to develop. Hence it is precisely in these trades that
Crouch’s idea of a Bgap^ in nineteenth-century interest representation and labor
relations is most applicable. In these trades, new technological inventions tended to
spread easily and rapidly across Europe and international competition was fierce (Hyde
1977), while large capital investments were required to enter these trades (Shin 1996).
As a result, Bnewcomers^ from outside the trade and often outside the region—traders,
private capital investors, banks—replaced the former guild masters as employers, and
they were unaccustomed to traditional workers’ rights and labor relations (Horster
1908). With unskilled manpower entering the factories from the countryside, former
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masters and journeymen were subjected to a process of proletarianization; traditional
status distinctions vanished, and with them solidarities and mechanisms to reconcile
conflicts. Consequently, workers’ organizations were late to arrive in these trades. In
the first half of the nineteenth century, mass protests and strikes against low wages and
worsening labor conditions were not uncommon, but were poorly organized and
usually unsuccessful, and they did not result in the emergence of structural forms of
workers’ interest representation (Hanagan 1988; Mikkelsen 1996). In this situation,
there was no urgency for employers to organize. Initially, employers’ organizations
established in these trades primarily focused on defending employers’ commercial
interests and lobbying local (and, occasionally, national) government. Only when labor
unions emerged did employers in these trades begin to coordinate their actions against
strikes and other union activities at the local level, and national employers’ associations
were established (Mclvor 1983; Van Waarden 1987; Herrigel 1996).
New artisanism
For various reasons, before 1800 not all trades in Western Europe had been regulated
by guilds. Moreover, during the nineteenth century, new trades emerged while occu-
pations that had been marginal now matured. The birth or growth of these trades and
occupations was often closely linked to technological advancements, requiring new
expert knowledge and techniques that subsequently became the domain of specific
occupational groups that, with variable success, tried to limit access to their expertise.
One example of this new artisanism was the engineers in The Netherlands, whose
predecessors were never organized in guilds. Its roots lay in a special service, the
Department of Waterways and Public Works (Rijkswaterstaat), created in 1798 for
national water management, as the Dutch Republic was transformed into a unitary state
and was staffed with an Engineer Corps for Water Management (Corps Ingenieurs van
den Waterstaat) (Davids 2008). Initially, Rijkswaterstaat staff members were recruited
from typically artisanal backgrounds—carpenters, surveyors, millwrights—but they
were soon replaced by the sons of public servants, including judges and army and
naval officers, sometimes even of aristocratic origin. New institutions were introduced,
like the Royal Academy for Civil Engineering (Koninklijke Akademie voor Burgerlijke
Ingenieurs) set up in Delft in 1842, which would acquire full academic status in 1905.
The launch of major infrastructural projects like new canals and railroad building added
prestige to the engineering profession (Disco 1990).
With their education and prospects secure, engineers started to organize. In 1847, the
Royal Engineers’ Institute (Koninklijk Instituut van Ingenieurs, KIVI)—still today the
trade’s leading professional organization—was founded, followed in 1853 by the
Society of Civil Engineers (Vereniging van Burgerlijke Ingenieurs, VBI). Both organi-
zations sought to improve the position of their members and the esprit de corps among
engineers; only Delft graduates were accepted as members. Of the active KIVI
members in the 1850s, one third was employed by Rijkswaterstaat and 16% by the
army; the other half worked in assorted jobs (Lintsen 1980). The VBI was, however,
incapable of regulating the labor market for engineers and had to accept its members’
redundancy when large infrastructural projects were terminated (Lintsen 1980). Nev-
ertheless, in the twentieth century, Delft Academy graduates became a very influential
occupational group in the Netherlands. As the state bureaucracy expanded, it became
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the purveyor of the technical ministries and even turned out cabinet ministers on a
regular basis (Disco 1990).
The engineering occupation in The Netherlands exemplifies occupations in our three
countries that were new in the nineteenth century or had transformed to such an extent that
by 1900 they hardly resembled their predecessors—like lawyers, who benefited from
national state formation, and university professors, who benefited both from technological
progress and the formation of national educational systems. Over the course of the
nineteenth century, they became the artisans of a new age, i.e., Bprofessionals.^ In some
cases, these professionals succeeded in gaining control over access to their trade in
manners reminiscent of the guilds before 1800. Like pre-1800 artisans, the new profes-
sions used their expert knowledge and techniques to erect barriers against outsiders.
Controlling occupational training and establishing exclusive professional associations
for the development of work standards and quality criteria, they managed to regulate
their labor markets, often backed up by government legislation (MacDonald 1995).
However, around 1900, the contribution of the new professionals to emerging
national political economies in the three countries became limited for at least two
reasons. First, precisely because access to the professions was often controlled by the
professional group and becoming a full member of the profession required prolonged
training, the numbers remained limited. By 1900 the Bfree professions^ as a percentage
of the total labor force did not exceeded 5% (see Table 3). Second, the relation between
Bmaster^ and Bapprentice^ tended to be (and still is) paternalistic and close, so a clear
employer-worker relationship failed to emerge. Even when the new professionals
became employees, their exclusive skills and specialized knowledge usually provided
them with a high level of autonomy vis-à-vis their employers (MacDonald 1995).
New industrialism
The sixth scenario coincides most with the standard notion of nineteenth-century indus-
trialization. In this scenario a trade emerged virtually out of the blue, facilitated by
technological innovations. The emergence of such a new trade was the product of creative
entrepreneurs and/or facilitated by state sponsorship, and it resulted in the typical Marxian
clash between a small caste of factory owners and a large new class of workers, flooding
in from the countryside and in due course organized in large-scale industrial unions.
One such trade was the German iron and steel industry. Modern German iron
foundries began in the eighteenth century, mostly in rural areas, benefiting (especially
in the Ruhr and Silesia) from the Prussian state’s support for proto-industry and the
absence of a strong guild structure. Mining was central to the location and operation of
early industrial iron and steel works, especially due to Germany’s lack of a substantial
railway network until the 1860s. This led to the industry’s concentration in areas of
mineral deposits, even if they had very little pre-existing economic basis. Many of the
important nineteenth-century Ruhr companies began as family enterprises, such as
Krupp in Essen and Thyssen in Duisburg (Feldenkirchen 1982).
The 1850s saw a major expansion in iron production in the Ruhr. The Ruhr’s first
coke-powered furnace opened in 1849 and in the next decade coke-smelting was
adopted widely. This was facilitated by the mining of hard coal and iron ore deposits
in the Ruhr valley. From the 1850s, the rapid expansion of the German railway system
created a huge demand, spurring industrialization and expansion of production
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(Fremdling 1977). Ruhr heavy industry became vertically integrated: mines, foundries,
and factories were often constructed close together and were owned by the same
company. Much of German heavy industry came to be dominated by employer cartels,
like the Schienengemeinschaft, which in 1870 controlled over 75% of domestic steel
sales. By the early twentiethh century, cartels were a major feature of the German
industrial economy (Webb 1980).
Labor migration was a key element in the rise of the German iron and steel industries
and in the allied mining sector, which from 1810 had been stimulated by Prussia
(Jackson 1997). Thus the iron and steel industries in the Ruhr employed large numbers
of unskilled migrant workers from nearby regions. While these unskilled migrant
Table 3 The labor force in Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom circa 1900, employment in
trades as percentage of total labor force
Germany
(1895)
Netherlands
(1899)
United
Kingdom
(1901)
Agriculture and forestry 41.8 31.0 13.0
Manufacturing 33.5 33.4 43.9
Bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc. 2.5 1.8 0.9
Building and contracting 4.4 7.6 5.8
Chemicals and allied industries 0.6 0.5 1.1
Clothing 5.9 4.8 4.0
Food, drink and tobacco 4.4 6.0 2.8
Gas, electricity, and water 0.1 0.2 1.4
Leather industries 0.2 2.1 1.2
Metal 5.1 4.3 12.1
Mining and quarrying 1.8 0.8 5.5
Paper, printing, and publishing 1.2 1.1 1.7
Textiles 4.2 2.1 5.9
Timber, furniture, etc. 2.9 2.0 1.4
Services 24.7 35.6 43.1
Transport and communication 2.6 7.1 7.8
Insurance, banking, distributive trades, hotels, etc. 8.4 10.3 13.9
Education 1.0 0.8 1.5
Private domestic services 6.7 10.3 10.6
Medical services 0.5 0.6 0.6
Public administration and defense 3.9 3.5 4.7
Free professions 1.5 3.0 4.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
For comparability reasons, some of the trades in the three countries have been redefined or merged
Sources: Germany: Hoffmann 1965. The Netherlands: www.volkstellingen.nl, retrieved 21 June 2015. The
UK: Feinstein 1972, Tables 129–131. Table 131 presents the outcome of the 1901 census, but does not provide
detailed figures for various trades within manufacturing. These have been estimated on the basis of the
calculated percentages for these trades of the total figure for Bmanufacturing^ in the 1920 census, which was
the first to provide such detailed figures
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workers had low job security and were exposed to business cycles and fluctuations,
skilled workers were well-paid and in high demand, and often migrated from far away.
Unionization did not begin until the late nineteenth century (Crew 1979). Due to the
often-huge size of the iron and steel companies and the absence of traditional labor
relations, labor relations were authoritarian, with the firms often owning the housing
and providing social insurance to employees and their families, and dominating the
areas around their factories, foundries, and mines. Finally, effective technical education
and training through factory apprenticeships were important elements of the German
iron and steel industry (Crew 1979).
In the nineteenth century in the three countries we selected for our analysis, only a
small minority of trades—those thriving on the real innovations of the time, like chemicals
and electricity—was really entirely new (see Table 3). And in the end, this Bnewness^ did
not distinguish them fundamentally from those highly industrialized trades that were not
so new and in which guilds had played an important role before the nineteenth century,
like the trades of the Bdestroyed artisanism^ type. In the new industrialized trades interest
organizations of workers and employers were late to arrive, while labor relations were
stressed and often violent. Eventually, as in the case of destroyed artisanism, this situation
did not result in the emergence of corporatist structures, but in conflict reconciliation on
the shop floor and in strong labor unions focusing on the national political arena for labor
protection and social security legislation.
From local to national citizenship rights
After exploring six scenarios of what happened to various artisan trades under the
influence of nineteenth-century economic liberalization and industrialization, we now
investigate which scenarios unfolded in Germany, the United Kingdom, and
The Netherlands. More specifically: What did the unfolding of specific trade scenarios
mean for the construction and type(s) of national citizenship rights in these countries,
and what was their role in shaping emerging national political economies?
Germany: decentralized corporatism, citizenship rights largely based
on occupational status
The standard conception of German industrialization in the second half of the nineteenth
century is one of rapidly emerging large-scale industrial firms, supported by state
sponsorship and large universal banks. This picture of a sudden and orchestrated indus-
trialization is only partially accurate. From the 1850s in Bpoor agricultural regions,
relatively free of preindustrial handicraft infrastructure and with relatively large class of
property-less labor,^ such large-scale firms did emerge, sometimes employing thousands
of workers (Herrigel 1996, p. 20). They were the result of the unfolding of the fourth
(destroyed artisanism) and sixth scenarios (new industrialization). From the 1840s in
sectors like textiles (e.g., in Silesia, Nuremberg, and Augsburg) and mining (e.g., in the
Ruhr Valley), new entrepreneurs with access to speculative capital and technologies
borrowed from early industrializers, like the United Kingdom and Belgium, set up
large-scale companies from scratch, wiping out the preindustrial order almost entirely.
Meanwhile, in some German regions entrepreneurs from outside set up trades largely new
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to these regions, e.g., iron and steelmaking in the Ruhr Valley, and the machinery industry
in Saxony, Berlin, the Ruhr Valley, and northern seacoast harbor towns like Hamburg and
Danzig. In the late nineteenth century, these entrepreneurs organized in cartels and trade-
specific employers’ associations, actively teaming up with the authorities of the new
German Reich to combat the emerging labor movement (Herrigel 1996).
Yet in the same period, a whole range of small- and medium-sized firms developed,
specializing in the production of high-quality products like metal ware and cutlery
(Remscheid, Solingen), optical equipment (Württemberg), weapons (Thüringen), and
special machinery (Mönchengladbach, Krefeld, and other towns on the left bank of the
Rhine), to mention only a few. Out of this hotchpotch of firms, a second institutional
structure emerged, which Herrigel (1996) dubbed the Bdecentralized industrial order .^
This order was composed of firms that developed more or less according to our second
and third scenarios—industrialized and liberalized artisanism—out of the preindustrial
guilds. In the half century following the French Period, the guilds had been more or less
reinstalled in most of the German states (Länder) by means of Brules which regulated
access to position in the crafts by establishing residence requirements and providing for
master-dominated examinations; laws which clearly distinguished between masters,
journeymen, and apprentices in terms of economic power, social standing and influence
within the changing guilds; master-dominated labour market regulations; various instru-
ments, by which both master organizations and communal authorities could try to control
journeymen, their hostels and their collective actions^ (Kocka 1984, p. 101). The
reinstatement of guild-like regulations benefitted primarily masters. Although in most
regions masters remained deprived of local political rights, due to the system of suffrage
based on property qualifications (Manow 1997), they regained the local economic rights
they had held before 1800, including control over local product markets and access to
skills-formation (Kocka 1984). Their firms were often family-owned and remained
deliberately small in order to be flexible and innovative, which was also accomplished
by closely cooperating with other small firms in the same town or region. By establishing
regional savings and cooperative banks (Sparkassen and Genossenschaftsbanken), often
in close collaboration with local authorities, the owners of these firms pooled capital and
facilitated innovation (Koselleck 1967; Bergmann 1973; Kocka 1986). In the smallest of
these firms, the relationship between master and skilled workers remained very close and
cooperative, signified by the fact that master and worker were often members of the same
local or regional craft chamber (Innung), the direct successors of the guilds. In the
somewhat bigger firms, journeymen were gradually pushed into wage labor and after
1850 organized into craft unions (Fachvereine), but labor relations continued to be
accommodating (Herrigel 1993; Kocka 1984, 1986).
From the 1840s, control over access to labor and product markets was gradually
transferred from guilds and local authorities to the Länder. To protect employment, improve
competitiveness of regional firms, and prevent a concentration of industry—which might
stimulate the emergence of large industrialists who could challenge their authority and cause
a proletarianization of the working population—the Länder authorities actively Bsteered^
the development of these trades. Due to this regionalization of economic policies interest
representation of employers also evolved along regional lines, resulting in mixed local and
regional associations that lobbied local and regional government and, from 1871 via these
and their national federation (the Bund der Industriellen), the political institutions of the
Reich (Herrigel 1996).
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The modernization of the artisan sector produced a dichotomy between Handwerk
and Industrie in the German economy still visible today. In 1907, the small and
medium-sized firms in Handwerk employed about half of Germany’s manufacturing
workers (see Table 4; also Kocka 1986; Herrigel 1996). Handwerk workers played a
decisive role in the establishment of the German labor movement in the closing decades
of the nineteenth century (Kocka 1984; Nolan 1986). Artisan workers could play this
important role, because workers in heavy industry were late to organize and many other
sections of the German labor force were not legally allowed to engage in union activity,
like domestic personnel, or were mentally or geographically too far away from the
places where union activity emerged, like agrarian workers. Moreover, unlike factory
workers in heavy industry, artisan workers could build on a long tradition of organi-
zation and interest representation (Kocka 1986). Many of the Bmodern^ German labor
unions established since 1860 were in fact the direct successors of the journeymen
brotherhoods (Genossenschaften) and mutual insurance funds (Kassen) that had sur-
vived the French Period or had been re-established in the early nineteenth century
(Hennock 2007).
From the 1860s, Handwerk workers also played a pivotal role in the establishment
of the first Socialist political parties, which would eventually merge into the Social
Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; Kocka
1986). These socialist parties gained momentum after national political rights, in the
form of suffrage for the Reichstag of the newly formed North German Confederation
(Norddeutscher Bund; replaced in 1871 by the German Reich), were granted in 1867 to
all males over age 25. In the late 1870s and the 1880s, the parties were actively
persecuted by the German authorities, culminating in Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Laws
(1878). Even after these laws were lifted in the early 1890s, national political citizen-
ship rights of German workers would remain very limited until World War I, due to the
small role of the Reichstag at the national level, and the systems of local and regional
Table 4 Percentages of the industrial working force by company size in Germany, The Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom in 1907
Number of
employees per company
Germany
Industrie and
Handwerk
The Netherlands
Industry
United Kingdom
BManufacturing^,
not including mining,
construction, and utilities
1–5 31.2 77.0 ?
6–10 7.0 11.7 ?
11–50 19.4 9.2 ?
51–200 20.8 1.7 ?
201–1000 16.7 0.3 ?
> 1000 4.9 0.1 12.4
Total 100.0 100.0 –
Sources: Germany: Hoffmann 1965, p. 212, Table 25. The Netherlands: Van der Does 1946, p. 185. The
figures refer to workers in companies that were mandatory insured against disability under the Ongevallenwet-
1901, which in this period only covered workers in industrial companies. The categories for the Netherlands
are: 1–4, 5–9, 10–49, 50–199, 200–999, and ≥ 1000. United Kingdom: Hannah 2008, p. 63, Table 2.
Unfortunately, percentages for the other categories are not available
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suffrage that continued to apply property qualifications until 1918 (Manow 1997). In
this situation, Socialist labor unions and political parties had no other choice than to
focus on attaining national economic and social citizenship rights for their members.
The same authoritarian German state that tried to frustrate unionism in other respects,
helped them—largely unintentionally—to achieve this objective. In the 1880s, Bis-
marck introduced several national social insurance schemes meant to weaken the
position of Socialist unions and parties and to divert the loyalty of their members to
the Reich. The schemes were largely modelled on the still-flourishing mutual insurance
funds that workers had established in the first half of the century. These were to be
administered by local and regional tripartite boards composed of employers’ and
unions’ representatives and functionaries of municipalities and Länder (Hennock
2007). Once in place, labor unions successfully used their strong position in workers’
communities to get their members elected to the boards; this not only enabled them to
strengthen their position amongst German workers—by means of clientelism and co-
optation—but also gradually expanded their influence on local, regional, and national
socio-economic decision-making (Nolan 1986; Manow 1997).
Steinmetz (1993, p. 44) claims that the creation of these Bproto-corporatist^ structures
also Blaid the groundwork for the full-fledged corporatism ofWeimar and adumbrated the
main lines of West Germany’s ‘social partnership.’^ While already around the turn of the
twentieth-century, bipartite corporatist structures had institutionalized at the regional level
in the industrialized and liberalized artisanal trades, multiplying collective bargaining
agreements, after World War I collective bargaining also became the standard in large-
scale industries like metal and machinery construction, albeit at the sectoral level. After
World War II, labor unions and employers’ associations would also start closing national
collective bargaining agreements, thus finalizing the complexGerman corporatist political
economy, composed of regional, national, and sectoral arenas (Herrigel 1996).
The United Kingdom: no corporatism, citizenship rights largely based
on citizenship status
As the first nation in history to industrialize the United Kingdom could build on
relatively favorable socio-economic and socio-political structures, in both rural and
urban areas. From the fifteenth century, in subsequent waves of Benclosures,^ land-
owners had merged small landholdings into larger and more productive and profitable
lease holds on a large scale, also swallowing up the commons which had been available
for peasants to graze their cattle. As a result, by the mid-eighteenth century not only
large numbers of unemployed and impoverished agricultural workers came available
for production in the first factories—a Brationalized^ British agricultural sector could
also feed them (Mathias 2001). Already in the course of the eighteenth century, in most
cities and towns many guilds had become ineffective, largely due to the inability or
unwillingness of authorities and courts to uphold the charters and regulations that had
underpinned their powers, especially the Statute of Artificers (1563), which had
regulated wages, movement and training of artisans, and the numbers and prices of
their products (Eisenberg 1991).
The disintegration of the guild system enabled newcomers to start new workshops in
towns and villages, facilitating the spread of a proto-industrial putting-out system,
which from the mid-eighteenth century transformed into the first mechanized factories,
274 Theor Soc (2018) 47:255–291
starting with cotton production in Lancashire. In subsequent decades, trades like coal-
mining (in the Midlands, Northumberland, Lancashire, Yorkshire, and parts of Scotland
and Wales) and iron and steel production began to benefit from the orders of cotton
manufacturers or their experimentation in mechanization and rationalization, and the
trades themselves took the first steps toward industrialization (Mathias 2001). Hence
the first round of industrialization in the United Kingdom between c. 1750 and the early
nineteenth century was characterized by the emergence of several near-new trades, like
cotton, or the complete transformation of trades that had so far been relatively marginal,
like coal, iron, and steel (new industrialism). Almost by definition, this was the work of
adventurous entrepreneurs Bdivorced from older traditions of urban life and
paternalism,^ who ploughed the profits of their early enterprises back into their
businesses or, when large investments in machines were required, borrowed the money
from big landowners, merchants, financiers, and other sections of the traditional British
elite. Unlike aristocracies in most other European countries, this elite group was far
from hostile to the emerging industries. In the early nineteenth century, in close
collaboration with the new industrial entrepreneurs organized into the Whig party, it
successfully pushed Parliament to lift all sorts of trade tariffs and legal barriers for
further capitalist and industrial development (Hobsbawm 1994, quote p. 231).
The liberalization of the British economy caused a second wave of industrialization,
which transformed a whole range of existing artisanal trades in consumer goods produc-
tion, such as food and drink, construction, shoemaking, carpentry, pottery and textiles
other than cotton, like linen and silk (Prothero 1979; Calhoun 1983). In these trades, a
specific form of the destroyed artisanism scenario unfolded. As in Germany, industrial-
ization in these trades resulted in the emergence of small- and medium-sized firms that
superficially resembled the modernized late-nineteenth century German artisanal work-
shops. Yet, unlike Germany, in Britain, industrialization in these trades did not take place
within a traditional order. With artisanal traditions severely weakened before industrial-
ization and prevailing socio-economic and socio-political conditions that made the revival
of those traditions very unlikely, it was predominantly newcomers—Bsmall, newly-
established master[s], undercutting in price, overworking labour, breaking apprenticeship
agreements^—who modernized production processes in these trades, in the process
simply outcompeting existing workshops that stuck with traditional production methods
(Mathias 2001, p. 365; Prothero 1979). As in Germany, English industrial firms in these
trades remained relatively small throughout the nineteenth century, but for different
reasons. In Germany, this was the result of strategies of masters trying to keep their firms
flexible and innovative and of local and regional government policies discouraging the
development of big industry. In the United Kingdom, workshops were forced Bwithin
structures dominated by large capital, through intensive sub-division of tasks and
subcontracting on the one hand, and dependence on large capital for credit and orders
on the other^ (Crossick 1997, p. 27).
During the first half of the nineteenth-century, traditional workshops in only a small
minority of trades survived by moving into niche markets of high-quality products or
specializing in made-to-measure products. In most other trades, traditional production
methods and labor relations gradually disappeared, blurring the lines between (former)
masters and journeymen, who increasingly stood on the same side when protesting the
infringement of their Btraditional rights^ (Prothero 1979; Chase 2000). By this time, local
citizenship rights of artisans and workers had been undermined almost everywhere,
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without being replaced by a new national citizenship. The repeal of the Statute of
Artificers by Parliament in 1813 only formalized a situation in which guild-related local
economic and social rights of artisans andworkers had already become ineffective inmost
regions. The local political rights that certain categories of craftsmen and laborers still
enjoyed in some boroughs and counties were nullified by the First Reform Act of 1832,
which confined the vote to men of property (Daunton 2001).
With the divide between masters and journeymen dissolving, traditional forms of
interest organization also lost their relevance in these trades, without other forms taking
their place for a long time. Until the 1840s, employer-encouraged active repression by
local and national government prevented the development of newworkers’ organizations.
The only form of working-class association that was permitted, and even encouraged by
the authorities were Bfriendly societies,^ voluntary mutual sickness and funeral insurance
funds of workers that were usually not restricted to any specific trade (Hennock 2007).
Only in the 1850s and 1860s was the spell on effective workers’ organization broken
by a combination of rapid changes, one being the changing character and outlook of the
workers’ population itself. By that time the Breactionary^ protests of master and journey-
men aimed at restoring Btraditional rights^ had waned, signifying that workers Bno longer
had strong ‘radical roots’ in preindustrial social organization^ (Calhoun 1983, p. 491).
Meanwhile unionism in the industrialized trades, like textiles and mining—characterized
by large plants and ditto worker forces (see Tables 3 and 4)—finally experienced their
breakthrough. Various types of workers’ organizations merged into strong BNewModel^
unions consolidated at the trade level. From the 1860s, these collaborated closely in the
national Trade Union Congress (TUC), which in subsequent decades would grow into a
formidable interest organization (Pelling 1987; Chase 2000). The advancement of modern
unionism in Britain was also facilitated by the authorities, which ceased their repressive
anti-union policies and legalized workers’ organizations in 1872 (Calhoun 1983). This
policy shift was part of a broader attempt to integrate the lower and middle classes into the
capitalist British nation. A series of franchise expansions in 1867–1884 gave the vote,
both at the local and the national level, to about 60% of male workers (Price 1990; for the
development of citizenship rights in the United Kingdom, see Table 5).
The coincidenceof the rise of modern unionism and the—compared to Germany (de
facto) and The Netherlands (formally)—early granting of national political citizenship
shaped the character of British unions. Early access to, and trust in, democratic institutions
stimulated a reformist, instead of revolutionary, outlook in the trade union movement
(Price 1990). From the 1870s, the unions and the TUC actively pushed and financed the
election of unionMembers of Parliament (MPs), who untilWorldWar I functioned within
the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party, more dependent on the working-class vote, when in
government enacted several Factory andWorkshopActs (1870–1901) that protected child
and female labor and regulated safety on the shop floor (Hennock 2007).
With national political citizenship secured for most of their members, unions could
concentrate on their struggles with industrial employers. While early in the century,
industrial employers had been loosely organized into clubs defending the commercial
interests of their members in specific trades, from the 1840s—in reaction to growing
workers’ protests and strikes—these clubs transformed into strike-breaking organiza-
tions, which at the local and regional levels coordinated lock-outs and insured their
members against their financial consequences. In the last two decades of the nineteenth
century, British industrial employers gradually shifted their strategy toward acceptance
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and recognition of trade unions. Part of this was the development of arbitration
procedures on the shop floor and collective bargaining at the trade level (Mclvor
1983; Adams 1997).
With the shop floor and sectoral negotiation platforms emerging as the place where
unions negotiated wages, perquisites, and labor conditions with employers’ associa-
tions, from the turn of the century unions (via their Liberal Party MPs and later via the
newly-formed Labour Party) propagated the establishment of national social insurance
schemes. In 1906, a Liberal government, supported by the Labour Party, introduced
national health insurance and national insurance schemes against sickness and unem-
ployment, followed two years later by a state pension scheme. At first these schemes
covered only parts of the British population, but during World War I and during the
interwar years these gradually expanded, taking shape as the BBeveridgian^ welfare
state that would be consolidated after World War II, with flat-rate and means-tested
benefits provided by state agencies to all eligible adult citizens (Hennock 2007).
The Netherlands: centralized corporatism and citizenship rights based
on occupational and citizenship status
Whereas nineteenth-century economic and political developments in Germany resulted in
the emergence of national citizenship rights largely based on occupational status and in the
United Kingdom on citizenship per se (i.e., membership in the national Bcommunity^), in
The Netherlands they produced a combination of both. Also in the development of a
national political economy, the Dutch case shows elements of both the British and German
experiences. The mixed character of national citizenship rights and the national political
economy can be largely explained by the dual structure of the Dutch economy after 1850.
This dual economic structure was partially a historical legacy of the Dutch Republic
of the Seven United Provinces (1581–1795). In the Republic, international trade and
finance had been among the dominating sectors, a position it still held by the late
nineteenth century (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997). In addition, in the Republic, as
an offshoot of international trade, especially with the Baltic region and the Dutch East
Indies, processing industries had emerged in and around Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
Already in the seventeenth century, mechanical techniques, often driven by windmills,
were used to process coffee, cacao, sugar, paper, and various oil types. In the early
nineteenth century, these were among the first Dutch trades to introduce steam ma-
chines and to scale up their production processes (Davids 2008).
Next to these large sectors, the economy of the Dutch Republic was characterized by
small artisan workshops run by masters who were usually organized into guilds. Access
to the guilds was usually dependent on local citizenship status, which, next to economic
rights, could also give access to political rights (electing city magistrates) and social
rights (membership of mutual social insurance funds) (Prak et al. 2006). National
citizenship was introduced under French occupation but offered very few rights
compared to the local citizenship it replaced (Prak 1997). The guilds were formally
abolished and not reinstalled when the Dutch state became independent again in 1813.
The result was that the vast majority of the population, including most artisans and
workers, was deprived of local political citizenship rights (Van Genabeek 1994), while
when the French left national voting rights were restricted to a small wealthy elite (Blok
1987) (for an overview of the development of citizenship rights in the Netherlands, see
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Table 5). Yet, due to economic stagnation and mercantile economic policies of both
local and national government, many guild-like regulatory mechanisms survived infor-
mally at least until the 1850s. This allowed artisans in many trades to maintain part of
their traditional local economic rights, like control over product and labor markets and
skills-formation, often by means of local cartels tolerated by the local authorities (Van
Zanden and Van Riel 2004). In this period about 80% of all Dutch manufacturing firms
were still small workshops of manual production by masters and their journeymen,
predominantly supplying the local market (Anderson and Oude Nijhuis 2012).
Until 1850, only in a few trades did the formal abolition of guild regulation stimulate
the introduction of new mechanized techniques and the establishment of large factories
(destroyed artisanism): production of textiles (Twente), glass and ceramics (the south-
ern city of Maastricht), sugar refinery (West Brabant), and shipbuilding (predominantly
in and around Amsterdam and Rotterdam). When, in the 1860s and 1870s, the Dutch
economy was finally liberalized through the abolition of local, regional, and national
tolls and tariffs, various new large-scale industries emerged (new industrialism), for
instance in chemicals (Rotterdam area), machine building (Amsterdam and Rotterdam)
and mining (the southern Limburg province) (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004). The
owners of these new industries were soon incorporated into the old socio-economic
elite of bankers, insurers, and traders, which gave them easy access to Parliament and
national government, and which for a long time made their formal organization
unnecessary. Only when labor unions also gained access to the political arena in The
Hague around 1900, did they establish the Association of Dutch Employers (Vereeni-
ging van Nederlandsche Werkgevers), which until the 1920s would remain the most
powerful socio-economic pressure group in the Netherlands (Hoogenboom 2004).
Meanwhile the liberalization of the Dutch economy after 1860 not only led to the
emergence of new large-scale industries, but also—as in Germany—to a transformation
and limited industrialization of existing artisanal trades like printing, construction,
clothing, and shoemaking (industrialized artisanism and liberalized artisanism). Yet
this process took much more time to unfold than in Germany, due to the late availability
of new technologies and to institutional factors such as low wages and high coal prices
resulting from the absence of large-scale coal mines and a comprehensive railroad
system until the 1890s (Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004). In 1907, almost 90% of the
total number of industrial firms still had 10 or fewer workers (See Table 4), while these
small companies still employed more than three-quarters of all Dutch manufacturing
workers. After 1900, in most manufacturing sectors the average number of workers per
employer would only increase slowly, if at all (Van Van Gerwen and Seegers 2003).
The gradual character of change had at least two consequences, which influenced
future Dutch national political economy. First, traditional labor relations between
employers and workers in the artisanal trades changed slowly, preserving the small
social divide between employers and workers as well as relatively harmonious labor
relations (e.g., Van der Ven 1953; Hoogenboom 2004). In the 1890s, employers and
workers from the artisanal trades were the driving forces behind the first attempts to
establish local corporatist structures (Van Van Veen 2013). Second, the gradual trans-
formation and industrialization in these trades also caused interest representation of
employers—and of workers (see below)—to develop slowly. Because of the size of
their firms and their own social status, employers in these trades had little access to the
national political arena. Only when, from the late 1880s, local and national voting
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rights were gradually extended, employers in these trades became a significant political
factor, especially in the emerging Protestant and Roman Catholic political parties. After
1900 they also established their own interest organizations, many with a religious
affiliation (Hoogenboom 2004).
The dual character of the Dutch economic structure and the slow transformation of the
artisanal sector were also reflected in workers’ interest representation. Abolition of the
guilds in the early nineteenth century had deprived journeymen of local political citizen-
ship rights, but the stagnant character of the economy and mercantile economic policies
had preserved many of their traditional economic (e.g., limited access to skills-formation
for outsiders) and social rights (e.g., membership in exclusive social insurance funds).
After the codification of the national right of association in 1855, craft unions became
more numerous, mostly in artisanal crafts like printing, construction, and gold- and silver-
smithing. Unlike their predecessors, these new unions acted as defenders of the
Btraditional rights^ of their members in situations where competition on product and
labor markets intensified due to the post-1860 liberalization of the Dutch economy. In the
1870s these craft unions were also the first to establish national unions and, subsequently
national federations of national craft unions in various trades (Hueting et al. 1983).
During the economic depression of the 1880s workers in the new industries also
started to mobilize, after decades of passivity, resulting in the establishment of new
industrial unions. In the 1890s this Bmodern^ labor union movement also produced the
first Marxist and Social-Democratic political parties, whose main demands were
universal suffrage, national labor legislation, and the creation of state-run social
insurance schemes. In the late 1890s and 1900s, provoked by large-scale strikes and
public demonstrations organized by these unions and political parties, the Liberal
majority in Parliament—which had close links to the interest organizations of heavy
industry—reacted by extending the vote, introducing the first labor legislation, and
creating some social insurance against the risks of occupational disability and old age,
administered by state-run agencies (Hoogenboom 2004).
From the turn of the century, labor unionism in The Netherlands was fundamentally
transformed under the influence of the process of Bpillarization^ that between 1900 and
1970 compartmentalized the Dutch population into segments or Bpillars^ according to
different religions or ideologies, each with its own political parties, labor unions, em-
ployers’ associations, periodicals, broadcasting associations, housing estates, and all sorts
of welfare and leisure organizations (Blom 2000). In the 1900s and 1910s, as part of this
process, craft and industrial unions were forced to join national Roman Catholic, Ortho-
dox Protestants, or Social Democratic union federations. This reshuffling of affiliations
forced craft unions to modernize their organization, while pacifying large parts of the
once-militant industrial unions, even in the Social Democratic pillar (Hoogenboom 2004).
When in 1917 and 1919 universal suffrage for adult males and women was introduced,
the Roman Catholic and Protestant political parties together succeeded in capturing a
majority in Parliament and a dominant position in the national government, which they
would retain long after World War II. This strong political position enabled confessional
employers’ associations and labor unions—which represented, more than the Social
Democratic unions, workers from the liberalized artisanal trades (Hoogenboom
2004)—to leave their mark on the emerging national political economy. From the
1920s, legislation was introduced that made national socio-economic decision-making
the domain of tripartite institutions composed of government representatives, national
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employers’ associations, and labor union federations. At the level of individual trades, this
system was backed up by bipartite corporatist institutions, where the branches of national
employers’ associations and labor union federations negotiated over wages and perqui-
sites. Topping the schemes created by Liberal governments in the early 1900s, and
partially replacing them, Roman Catholic and Protestant cabinet coalitions—supported
by confessional labor unions and employers—subsequently introduced a series of Bis-
marckian insurances (against risks of sickness, unemployment, and parenthood), with
wage-related benefits administered by the branches of national employers’ associations
and labor union federations collectively. This corporatist administrative system would
remain in force until 2002 (Van Waarden 2002).
Conclusion and discussion
Not so very long ago, the birth of modern society looked like a straightforward story: two
simultaneous revolutions created a clear break with the past, delivering the industrialized
economy and democratic nation-states to the world. Historians and social scientists have
come to acknowledge the flaws in this argument, realizing that the rupture was not so
clear-cut and that many Old Regime traits survived long into the Bmodern^ era. Alterna-
tive analytical narratives have been handicapped by taking for granted the national context
whose emergence they wanted to explain. We have traced the emergence of the new
national political economies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on the
disaggregated levels of trades and localities, and we have demonstrated under what
circumstances continuities from the Old Regime could be incorporated into the new
institutional structures. This very much depended, we showed above, on the continued
vitality of on the one hand crafts and, on the other hand, local and regional authorities
within the national framework. Where both were lacking, as in England, the standard
narrative of Bmodernization theory^ continues to apply. Where both were strong, as in
Germany, a corporatist governance structure was likely to emerge. When the two were
balanced, as in The Netherlands, a double structure emerged.
We showed how early forms of citizenship contributed to the formation of twentieth-
century political economies in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom by
investigating the development of various trades throughout the nineteenth century. To enable
the investigation of persistence, we distinguished six scenarios of whatmight have happened
to these pre-industrial crafts during the transition to an industrial economy. These scenarios
were discussed and illustrated with concrete histories of trades and industries, and the
contours were sketched of the sort of labor relations and regulatory mechanisms emerging
for each type of trade. Next we established which scenarios were dominant in each of the
three countries and how the political economies they produced interacted with the develop-
ment of national political structures, resulting in national political economies and the
distribution of national economic, political, and social citizenship rights.
Based on the analysis of the three countries we selected for our analysis, we conclude
that the claims put forward in the literature about the importance of guild traditions in the
formation of national political economies are only partially correct. First, we showed that in
the three countries the formal abolition of guilds did not automatically mean the end of the
old regulatory mechanisms. In practice, artisans often remained capable of regulating
access to their trade and skills-formation far into the nineteenth century. Here our analysis
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demonstrates the fruitfulness of an approach that not only takes into account the evolution
of formal economic and political institutions (see, for example, Crouch 1986, 1993, and
Cusack et al. 2007), but also analyzes economic developments (cf. Kocka 1984 1986;
Breuilly 1985; Herrigel 1993 1996; Crossick 1997), as we have applied here. By analyzing
various types of trades—each with its own institutional and technological characteristics—
we can better understand how and why guild traditions survived in some trades and not in
others, and how and whether they could be scaled-up from the local to the national level.
Second, by focusing on trades, rather than on the national political economy, our
analysis demonstrates that in the three countries we selected for our analysis a wide
variety of trades—some in which guild traditions survived, others in which these
traditions had never existed or were destroyed in the nineteenth century—existed
side-by-side. In the end, decisive in the formation of national political economies and
citizenship rights were not some general national patterns, as for example Crouch
(Crouch 1986, 1993) claims, but which of these trades came to dominate the develop-
ment of national political economies by the end of the nineteenth century.
Third, in analytical terms, this article demonstrates that the creation of national political
economy institutions by the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries was not
necessarily a story of Bpower resources^, as many neo-institutional authors (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000; Thelen 2004) claim—i.e., a story of
political actors and social movements struggling over whose blueprint for a national political
economy was to be implemented. Whether the construction of a national political economy
was an open fight depended on the availability of an existing institutional Bpath^ and how
that might affect the course of national political economy and citizenship formation. Where
such a path was well developed and had adapted to new circumstances (like in our
industrialized artisanism and liberalized artisanism scenarios), as inGermany, it could deeply
influence the national political economy institutions that were taking shape by the end of the
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Where such a path was available but new
industrial forces were equally strong, as in The Netherlands, this resulted in a national
economy combining Bpremodern^ and Bmodern^ features. And where no such path was
available or had been destroyed at an early stage, as in the United Kingdom, the construction
of a national political economy was indeed an open fight and a national political economy
could be built almost from scratch, resulting in the industrialized economy and the demo-
cratic nation-state that we know from the standard version of Bmodernization theory.^
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Adams, T. (1997). Market and institutional forces in industrial relations: The development of national
collective bargaining, 1910-1920. Economic History Review, 50(3), 506–530.
Anderson, K., & Oude Nijhuis, D. (2012). The long road to collective skill formation in the Netherlands. In M.
R. Busemeyer & C. Trampusch (Eds.), The political economy of collective skill formation (pp. 101–125).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beier, G. (1968). Schwarze Kunst und Klassenkampf. Geschichte der Industriegewerkschaft Druck und Papier
und ihrer Vorläufer seit dem Beginn der modernen Arbeiterbewegung. Band I, 1830–1890. Frankfurt-am-
Main: Europäischen Verlagsanstalt.
286 Theor Soc (2018) 47:255–291
Bergmann, J. (1973).Das Berliner Handwerk in den Frühphasen der Industrialisierung. Berlin: ColloquiumVerlag.
Biernacki, R. (1995). The fabrication of labor. Germany & Britain, 1640–1914. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Blok, L. (1987). Stemmen en kiezen: Het kiesstelsel in Nederland in de periode 1814–1850. Groningen: Wolters.
Blom, J. C. H. (2000). Pillarisation in perspective. West European Politics, 23, 153–164.
Boix, C. (1999). Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies. The
American Political Science Review, 93(3), 609–624.
Boot, J. A. P. G. (1935). De Twentsche katoennijverheid 1830–1873. Amsterdam: H.J. Paris.
Boyer, G. R. (2004). The evolution of unemployment relief in Great Britain. The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, 34(3), 393–433.
Brantz, D. (2003). Slaughter in the city: The establishment of public abbatoirs in Paris and Berlin, 1780–1914.
Dissertation University of Chicago.
Breuilly, J. (1985). Artisan economy, artisan politics, artisan ideology: the artisan contribution to the 19th
century European labour movement. In C. Emsley & J. Walvin (Eds.), Artisans, peasants, and proletar-
ians, 1760–1860: Essays presented to Gwyn A. Williams (pp. 187–225). London: Croom Helm.
Bythell, D. (1969). The handloom weavers. A study in the English cotton industry during the Industrial
Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Calhoun, C. (1983). The roots of radicalism: Tradition, the public sphere, and early nineteenth-century social
movements. Theory and Society, 12(4), 485–504.
Chase, M. (2000). Early Trade Unionism: Fraternity, Skill, and the Politics of Labour. Ashgate: Brookfield.
Crew,D. (1979).Town in the Ruhr: A social history of Bochum, 1860–1914. NewYork: ColumbiaUniversity Press.
Crossick, G. (1997). Past masters: In search of the artisan in European history. In G. Crossick (Ed.), The
artisan and the European town, 1500–1900 (pp. 1–40). Aldershot/Brookfield: Scolar Press.
Crouch, C. (1986). Sharing public space: States and organized interests in Western Europe. In J. A. Hall (Ed.),
States in history (pp. 177–210). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Crouch, C. (1993). Industrial relations and European state traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crouch, C. (2001). Welfare state regimes and industrial relations systems: The questionable role of path
dependency theory. In B. Ebbinghaus & P. Manow (Eds.), Comparing welfare capitalism: Social policy
and political economy in Europe, Japan and the USA (pp. 105–124). London: Routledge.
Crouch, C. (2005). Capitalist diversity and change. Recombinant governance and institutional entrepreneurs.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cusack, T. R., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2007). Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. The
American Political Science Review, 101(3), 373–391.
Daunton, M. (2001). Introduction. In idem, The Cambridge urban history of Britain, Vol. 3, 1840–1950 (pp.
1–56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davids, K. (2008). The rise and decline of Dutch technological leadership: Technology, economy and culture
in the Netherlands, 1350–1800. Leiden: Brill.
De Vries, J. (1971). Het censuskiesrecht en de welvaart in Nederland 1850–1917. Economisch- ensocial-
historisch jaarboek, 34, 178–231.
De Vries, J., & Van der Woude, A. (1997). The first modern economy: Success, failure, and perseverance of
the Dutch economy, 1500–1815. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Disco, C. (1990). Made in Delft. Professional engineering in the Netherlands, 1880–1940. Dissertation,
University of Amsterdam.
Eisenberg, C. (1991). Artisans' socialization at work: Workshop life in early nineteenth-century England and
Germany. Journal of Social History, 24(3), 507–520.
Epstein, S. A. (1991). Wage labor and guilds in medieval Europe. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press.
Epstein, S. R. (1998). Craft guilds, apprenticeship and technological change in pre-modern Europe. Journal of
Economic History, 53, 684–713.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Fahrmeir, A. K. (1997). Nineteenth-century German citizenships: A reconsideration. The Historical Journal,
40, 721–752.
Feinstein, C. H. (1972). National income, expenditure and output of the United Kingdom, 1855–1965.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feldenkirchen, W. (1982). Die Eisen- und Stahlindustrie des Ruhrgebiets, 1879–1914. Wachstum,
Finanzierung und Struktur ihrer Grossunternehmen. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.
Finlayson, G. (1994). Citizen, state and social welfare in Britain 1830–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fremdling, R. (1977). Railroads & German economic growth: A leading sector analysis with a comparison to
the United States and Great Britain. Journal of Economic History, 37(3), 583–604.
Theor Soc (2018) 47:255–291 287
Grady, K. (2000). The cattle and meat trades in Leeds, 1780–1900. Northern History, 37(1), 133–155.
Guinnane, T. W., & Timothy, W. (2001). Cooperatives as information machines: German rural cooperatives,
1883-1914. Journal of Economic History, 61, 366–389.
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative
advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hanagan, M. (1988). Solidary logics. Introduction. Theory and Society, 17, 309–327.
Hannah, L. (2008). Logistics, Market Size, and Giant Plants in the Early Twentieth Century: A Global View.
The Journal of Economic History, 68(1), 46–79.
Hennock, E. P. (2007). The origin of the welfare state in England and Germany, 1850–1914: Social policies
compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Herrigel, G. (1993). Identity and institutions: The social construction of trade unions in nineteenth-century
Germany and the United States. Studies in American Political Development, 7, 371–394.
Herrigel, G. (1996). Industrial constructions: The sources of German industrial power. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Hobsbawm, E. (1994). The Age of Revolution: 1789–1848. London: Little, Brown & Co
Hofmeester, K. (2004). Jewish workers and the labour movement: A comparative study of Amsterdam,
London and Paris, 1870–1914. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Hoffmann W.G. (1965). Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Hoogenboom, M. (2004). Standenstrijd en zekerheid. Een geschiedenis van oude orde en sociale zekerheid in
Nederland. Amsterdam: Boom.
Horster, P. (1908). Die Entwicklung der Sächsischen Gewerbeverfassung, 1780–1861. Crefeld: Wilhelm
Greven
Hueting, E., De Jong, E. F., & Neij, R. (1983). Naar groter eenheid. De geschiedenis van het Nederlands
Verbond van Vakverenigingen 1906–1981. Amsterdam: Van Gennep.
Hyde, C. H. (1977). Technological change and the British iron industry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jackson, J. H. (1997). Migration and urbanization in the Ruhr Valley, 1821–1914. Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press.
Jones, P. E. (1976). The butchers of London. London: Secker and Warburg.
Jones, R. H. (1987). Technology, transaction costs, and the transition to factory production in the British silk
industry, 1700-1870. Journal of Economic History, 47, 75–76.
Katzenstein, P. (1985). Small states in world markets. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kluge, A. (2007). Die Zünfte. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
Knotter, A. (1984). De Amsterdamse bouwnijverheid in de 19ee eeuw tot ca. 1870: Loonstarheid en trekarbeid
op een dubbele arbeidsmarkt. Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 10, 123–154.
Knotter, A. (1993). Van ‘defensieve standsreflex’ tot ‘verkoopkartel van arbeidskracht’. Tijdschrift voor
Sociale Geschiedenis, 19, 68–93.
Kocka, J. (1984). Craft traditions and the labour movement in nineteenth-century Germany. In P. Thane, G.
Crossick, & R. Floud (Eds.), The power of the past. Essays for Eric Hobsbawm (pp. 95–117). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kocka, J. (1986). Problems of working-class formation in Germany: The early years, 1800-1875. In I.
Katznelson & A. R. Zolberg (Eds.), Working-class formation. Nineteenth century patterns in Western
Europe and the United States (pp. 279–351). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kocka, J. (1990). Arbeitsverhältnisse und Arbeiterexistenzen. Grundlagen der Klassenbildung im 19
Jahrhundert. Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf.
Koselleck, R. (1967). Preuβen zwischen Reform und Revolution. Allgemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung und
soziale Bewegung von 1791 bis 1848. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Kühne, T. (1994). Dreiklassenwahlrecht und Wahlkultur in Preußen, 1867–1914: Landtagswahlen zwischen
korporativer Tradition und politischem Massenmarkt. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.
Leisink, P., & Leisink, H. (1994). t Schild der solidariteit. Een sociaalhistorische studie van 125 jaar grafische
arbeidsverhoudingen en vakbondswerk. Amsterdam: FNV Pers/Druk en Papier FNV.
Lenger, F. (1991). Beyond exceptionalism. Notes on the artisanal phase of the labour movement in France,
England, Germany and the United States. International Review of Social History, 36(1), 1–23.
Lintsen, H. (1980). Ingenieurs in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw. Een streven naar erkenning en macht.
The Hague: Nijhoff.
MacDonald, K. M. (1995). The sociology of the professions. London: SAGE.
MacLachlan, I. (2004). The greatest and most offensive nuisance that ever disgraced the capital of a Kingdom:
The slaughterhouses and shambles of modern Edinburgh. Review of Scottish Culture, 17, 57–71.
288 Theor Soc (2018) 47:255–291
MacLachlan, I. (2007). A bloody offal nuisance. The persistence of private slaughter-houses in nineteenth-
century London. Urban History, 34(2), 227–254.
Mahoney, J. (2000). Path dependency in historical sociology. Theory and Society, 29, 507–548.
Manow, P. (1997). Social insurance and the German political economy. Cologne: MPIfG Discussion Paper 97/2.
Marshall, T. H. (1992/1950). Citizenship and social class. In T. H. Marshall & T. Bottomore (Eds.), Citizenship
and social class (pp. 3–51). London: Pluto Press.
Mathias, P. (2001). The first industrial nation: The economic history of Britain 1700–1914. London:
Routledge.
McKenna, A. J., & Rodger, R. G. (1985). ‘Control by coercion’: Employers' associations and the establish-
ment of industrial order in the building industry of England and Wales, 1860-1914. Business History
Review, 59(2), 203–231.
Mclvor, A. J. (1983). Employers’ associations and industrial relations in Lancashire, 1890–1939.
Dissertation, Manchester University.
Mikkelsen, F. (1996). Working-class formation in Europe: In search of a synthesis. Amsterdam: International
Institute of Social History.
Nolan, M. (1986). Economic crisis, state policy, and working-class formation in Germany, 1870–1900. In
Katznelson & Zolberg, Working-class formation (pp. 352–393).
Pelling, H. (1987). A history of British trade unionism. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Pierson, P. (2000). The limits of design: Explaining institutional origins and change.Governance, 13(4), 475–499.
Powell, C. (1996). The British building industry since 1800. An economic history. London: E. & F.N. Spon.
Prak, M. (1996). Individual, corporation and society: The rhetoric of Dutch guilds (18th. C.). In M. Boone &
M. Prak (Eds.), Individual, corporate, and judicial status in European cities late middle ages and early
modern period (pp. 255–279). Louvain/Apeldoorn: Garant.
Prak, M. (1997). Burghers into citizens: Urban and national citizenship in the Netherlands during the
revolutionary era (c. 1800). Theory and Society, 26, 403–420.
Prak, M. (2018). Citizens without nations. In Urban citizenship in Europe and the world, 1000–1789.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Prak, M., Lis, C., Lucassen, J., & Soly, H. (Eds.). (2006). Craft guilds in the early modern. Low Countries:
Work, power, and representation. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Price, R. (1990). Britain. In M. van der Linden & J. Rojahn (Eds.), The formation of labour movements 1870–
1914. An international perspective (Vol. 1, pp. 3–24). Leiden: E.J. Britt.
Prothero, I.J. (1979). Artisans and politics in early nineteenth-century London. John Gast and his times.
Folkestone: Wm Dawson & Son.
Quataert, J. (1985). The shaping of women's work in manufacturing: Guilds, households, and the state in
Central Europe, 1648-1870. American Historical Review, 90(5), 1122–1148.
Rokkan, S. (1970). Citizens, elections, parties: Approaches to the comparative study of the processes of
development. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Rosser, G. (2015). The art of solidarity in the Middle Ages: Guilds in England 1250–1550. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Rule, J. (1981). The experience of labour in eighteenth-century industry. London: Croom Helm.
Sabel, C. F., & Zeitlin, J. (1985). Historical alternatives to mass production: Politics, markets and technology
in nineteenth-century industrialization. Past & Present, 108, 133–176.
Sabel, C. F., & Zeitlin, J. (2002). Stories, strategies, structures: Rethinking historical alternatives to mass
production. In C. F. Sabel & J. Zeitlin (Eds.), World of possibilities. Flexibility and mass production in
Western industrialization (pp. 1–33). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schalk, R. (2016). Splitting the bill: Matching schooling to Dutch labour markets, 1750–1920. Meppel: Boom.
Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and interests. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Shin, J.-S. (1996). The economics of the latecomers: Catching-up, technology transfer, and institutions in
Germany, Japan, & South Korea. London: Routledge.
Steinmetz, G. (1993). Regulating the social. The welfare state and local politics in imperial Germany.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Thelen, K. (2004). How institutions evolve: The political economy of skills in Germany, Britain, the United
States and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Trompetter, C. (1997). Agriculture, proto-industry and mennonite entrepreneurship: A history of the textile
industries in Twente 1600–1815. Amsterdam: NEHA.
Van der Does, L. P. (1946). De sociale verzekering. Deel I: De economische beteekenis der sociale zekerheid.
Deventer: Kluwer
Theor Soc (2018) 47:255–291 289
Van der Ven, F.J.H.M. (1953). De sociale ontwikkeling van het Brabantse volk. In J.E. de Quay (ed.), Het
nieuwe Brabant. Deel II: Het Brabantse volk (pp. 61–127). Den Bosch: Provinciaal Genootschap van
Kunsten en Wetenschappen.
Van Genabeek, J. A. G. M. (1994). De afschaffing van de gilden en de voortzetting van hun functies. NEHA-
Jaarboek, 57, 63–90.
Van Gerwen, J., & Seegers, C. (2003). De industrialisatie van Nederland en het industriële grootbedrijf. NEHA
Jaarboek, 66, 138–171.
Van Leeuwen, M. H. D. (2012). Guilds and middle-class welfare, 1550-1800: provisions for burial, sickness,
old age, and widowhood. Economic History Review, 65, 61–90.
Van Nederveen Meerkerk, E., Heerma van Voss, L., & Hiemstra-Kuperus, E. (2010). The Netherlands. In L.
Heerma van Voss, E. Hiemstra, & E. Van Nederveen Meerkerk (Eds.), The Ashgate companion to the
history of textile workers, 1650–2000 (pp. 363–398). Ashgate: Aldershot.
Van Nierop, H. F. K. (2007). Popular participation in politics in the Dutch Republic. In P. Blickle (Ed.),
Representation, representation, and community (pp. 272–290). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Van Veen, A. (2013). De Kamers van Arbeid. Experimenten met politieke vertegenwoordiging in Nederland
rond 1900. Low Countries Historical Review, 128(2), 31–61.
Van Waarden, F. (1987). Het geheim van Twente. Fabrikantenverenigingen in de oudste grootindustrie van
Nederland, 1800–1940. Amersfoort/Leuven.
Van Waarden, F. (2002). Dutch consociationalism and corporatism. A case of institutional persistence. Acta
Politica, 37(1–2), 44–67.
Van Zanden, J. L., & Van Riel, A. (2004). The strictures of inheritance. The Dutch economy in the nineteenth
century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Webb, S. B. (1980). Tariffs, cartels, technology, and growth in the German steel industry, 1879 to 1914.
Journal of Economic History, 40(2), 303–330.
Wels, C. B. (1979). Stemmen en kiezen 1795–1922. Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis, 92, 313–332.
Welskopp, T. (2010). The vision(s) of work in the nineteenth-century German labour movement. In Kocka
(ed.), Work in a modern society: The German experience in comparative perspective (pp. 55–72). New
York: Berghahn.
Wolthuis, J. (1999). Lower technical education in the Netherlands 1798-1993. The rise and fall of a
subsystem. Dissertation University of Groningen
Yarmie, A. H. (1980). Employers’ organizations in mid-Victorian England. International Review of Social
History, 25, 209–235.
Marcel Hoogenboom is Professor in the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science at Utrecht University,
The Netherlands. His research covers the history of the welfare state, labor history, and comparative welfare
state analysis. He has published widely on the origins of the welfare state in Western Europe. One of his key
publications is BTransnational unemployment insurance: The inclusion and exclusion of foreign workers in
labour unions’ unemployment insurance funds in the Netherlands (approx. 1900-1940).^ International Review
of Social History, 58(2) (2013).
Christopher Kissane works for the Royal Historical Society in London and is a Visiting Fellow in the
Department of Economic History at London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of
Food, Religion and Communities in Early Modern Europe (Bloomsbury 2018), and is a BBC/AHRC New
Generation Thinker. His research covers early modern social and cultural history, including food, Reformation,
Inquisition, witchcraft, and citizenship. He is also currently working on the history of modern Irish migration.
Maarten Prak is Professor of Economic and Social History at Utrecht University, The Netherlands. He has
been a visiting scholar at universities in Cambridge, Exeter, and Münster, at the London School of Economics
and Political Science, and at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. He has written widely
on citizenship and related topics, and his book Citizens Without Nations: Urban Citizenship and the World,
1000–1789 is being published by Cambridge University Press in October 2018. He published earlier work in
Theory and Society in 1991 and 1997.
Patrick Wallis is Professor of Economic History at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
He is an economic and social historian focusing on early modern Europe, with a long-standing interest in
understanding how corporate institutions affect the production of human capital and reproduce or reinforce
inequalities in labor markets and societies. He is the editor of a forthcoming volume with Cambridge
290 Theor Soc (2018) 47:255–291
University Press on apprenticeship in early modern Europe (2018), which seeks to identify and explore the
variations across the continent in training systems and how the institutional, political, and economic differ-
ences between countries and cities affects the characteristics of the transition of young people into the skilled
workforce.
Chris Minns is Professor in the Economic History Department at the London School of Economics and
Political Science. His research interests are in historical labor markets, focusing mainly on issues related to
migration, education, and training, and the structure of work and pay. Recent publications include BThe price
of human capital in a pre-industrial economy: premiums and apprenticeship contracts in 18th Century
England,^ with Patrick Wallis, in Explorations in Economic History (2013); BInstitutions, history, and wage
bargaining outcomes in the post-World War II era,^ with Marian Rizov, Business History (2015), and
BReverse assimilation? Immigrants in the Canadian labour market during the Great Depression,^ with Kris
Inwood and Fraser Summerfield, in the European Review of Economic History (2016).
Theor Soc (2018) 47:255–291 291
